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Abstract
Several quantum versions of the battle of the sexes game are analyzed. Some of them are
shown to reproduce the classical game. In some, there are no Nash quantum pure equilibria.
In some others, the payoffs are always equal to each other. In others still, all equilibria favor
Alice or Bob depending on a phase shift of the initial state of the system. Explicit detailed
calculations are for the first time exhibited.
1 Introduction
Since Meyer´s [1] idea of quantizing classical games, a flood of papers have been published on this
theme. Although that author´s motivation was to explore the mathematical resemblance between
mixed strategies and quantum superposition, the strongest argument in favor of this line of research
is the pending question about the possibility of existence of quantum algorithms computationally
more efficient then classical ones for the solution of large sequential games (like chess, for instance);
research in this line is described in [2], [3], [4], [5] and [6]. If such algorithms do exist, they must be
applied to a quantum version of the classical game, thus requiring the fidelity of the former to the
late one.
Several quantum versions for the battle of the sexes game have been proposed [7], [8], [9], [10].
Benjamin and Hayden [11] recommend Eisert´s [12] quantization scheme, which computes the final
state as |Ef 〉 = J† (UA ⊗ UB)J |Ei〉, because it generalizes correctly the classical game. Here, this
last framework is used. Firstly, the operator J is set equal to Eisert´s with γ = pi2 (which totally
entangles the qubits) and four cases are analyzed: (3,3), meaning unrestricted UA and UB (each
one thus defined by three real numbers); (2,2), which is the restricted version used by Eisert; (2,1),
in which one of the players uses a restricted quantum operator and the other can only use classical
ones; and (1,1), which corresponds to the classical game. Then, J is set to the identity and the
results for some initial states |Ei〉 are obtained; the interesting cases here are when |Ei〉 is an
entangled state combining the two pure equilibria of the classical game.
2 The classical game
Alice and Bob are dating and want to go out together on Saturday night. But Bob prefers to go
to the football , whilst Alice prefers to go to the ballet. Each one prefers to go with the other to
the show (s)he doesn´t like instead of going alone to the show (s)he likes. The following table may
represent the personal satisfaction (payoff) of each player in the four possible situations:
Bob
Alice

 Football(F ) Ballet(B)Football (1, 2) (0, 0)
Ballet (0, 0) (2, 1)


Lines represent Alice´s choices and columns, Bob´s. The first entry in each ordered pair
is Alice´s payoff and the second one, Bob´s. The decisions have to be made simultaneously,
1
2independently and thoroughly followed.
This game has two pure equilibria: FF and BB and a mixed one, in which Alice chooses ballet
with probability 23 and Bob chooses football with probability
2
3 .
3 Quantization
The two possible choices (F or B) can be associated with the direction (up or down) of the spin of
the nucleus of a carbon 13 atom, for instance, embedded in a magnetic field. Suppose Alice and Bob
control, each, one atom. Two initial states are considered here (of the four possible ones): |FF〉 and
|BB〉 , corresponding to the pure equilibria of the classical game. The judge entangles the qubits
with the aid of the operator
J = ei
γ
2
C⊗C = ei
pi
4
C⊗C = e
i pi
4

 0 1−1 0

⊗

 0 1−1 0


=
= e
ipi
4


0 0 0 1
0 0 −1 0
0 −1 0 0
1 0 0 0


= e


0 0 0 ipi4
0 0 −ipi4 0
0 −ipi4 0 0
ipi4 0 0 0


=


cos pi4 0 0 i sin
pi
4
0 cos pi4 −i sin pi4 0
0 −i sin pi4 cos pi4 0
i sin pi4 0 0 cos
pi
4

 =


1
2
√
2 0 0 12 i
√
2
0 12
√
2 − 12 i
√
2 0
0 − 12 i
√
2 12
√
2 0
1
2 i
√
2 0 0 12
√
2


Defining the basis of the system´s state space as {|FF 〉, |FB〉, |BF 〉|BB〉}, it follows that
|FF 〉 = (1, 0, 0, 0),
|FB〉 = (0, 1, 0, 0), |BF 〉 = (0, 0, 1, 0), |BB〉 = (0, 0, 0, 1). Thus, J |FF 〉 = ( 12√2, 0, 0, 12 i√2) and
J |BB〉 = ( 12 i√2, 0, 0, 12√2) .
Notice that J |FF 〉 and J |BB〉 seem to be fair in the sense that they assign equal probabilities
(12 =
∣∣ 1
2 i
√
2
∣∣2 = ∣∣12√2∣∣) to both pure equilibria (FF and BB) of the classical game.
Now, Alice chooses a quantum operator UA and Bob, UB , each one acting only upon his
own atom (qubit). As stated in the introduction, the final state is computed by |Ef 〉 =
J† (UA ⊗ UB)J |Ei〉 and the qubits are measured, thus collapsing to one of the four basis states,
corresponding to the four possible outcomes of the classical game. If |Ef 〉 = (r, s, t, u), meaning
|Ef 〉 = r|FF 〉 + s|FB〉+ t|BF 〉+ u|BB〉, the expected payoffs are, then:
$A = |r|2 + 2 |u|2
$B = 2 |r|2 + |u|2
General quantum unitary operators acting over one qubit can be defined by
UA =
[
a b
−b∗ a∗
]
UB =
[
c d
−d∗ c∗
]
with |a|2 + |b|2 = |c|2 + |d|2 = 1 (see [10]).
Now,
UA ⊗ UB =
[
a b
−b∗ a∗
]
⊗
[
c d
−d∗ c∗
]
=


a
[
c d
−d∗ c∗
]
b
[
c d
−d∗ c∗
]
−b∗
[
c d
−d∗ c∗
]
a∗
[
c d
−d∗ c∗
]

 =
3

ac ad bc bd
−ad∗ ac∗ −bd∗ bc∗
−b∗c −b∗d a∗c a∗d
b∗d∗ −b∗c∗ −a∗d∗ a∗c∗


So
(UA ⊗ UB)J |FF 〉 =


1
2ac
√
2 + 12 ibd
√
2
− 12ad∗
√
2 + 12 ibc
∗√2
− 12b∗c
√
2 + 12 ia
∗d
√
2
1
2b
∗d∗
√
2 + 12 ia
∗c∗
√
2


(UA ⊗ UB)J |BB〉 =


1
2 iac
√
2 + 12bd
√
2
− 12 iad∗
√
2 + 12bc
∗√2
− 12 ib∗c
√
2 + 12a
∗d
√
2
1
2 ib
∗d∗
√
2 + 12a
∗c∗
√
2


The Hermitian conjugate of J is
J† =


1
2
√
2 0 0 − 12 i
√
2
0 12
√
2 12 i
√
2 0
0 12 i
√
2 12
√
2 0
− 12 i
√
2 0 0 12
√
2


As a consequence,
J† (UA ⊗ UB)J |FF 〉 =


1
2ac+
1
2 ibd− 12 ib∗d∗ + 12a∗c∗
− 12ad∗ + 12 ibc∗ − 12 ib∗c− 12a∗d
− 12 iad∗ − 12bc∗ − 12b∗c+ 12 ia∗d
− 12 iac+ 12bd+ 12b∗d∗ + 12 ia∗c∗

 =


Re(ac)− Im(bd)
Im(b∗c)− Re(a∗d)
Im(ad∗)− Re(bc∗)
Re(bd) + Im(ac)


And
J† (UA ⊗ UB)J |BB〉 =


1
2 iac+
1
2bd+
1
2b
∗d∗ − 12 ia∗c∗
− 12 iad∗ + 12 bc∗ + 12b∗c+ 12 ia∗d
1
2ad
∗ + 12 ibc
∗ − 12 ib∗c+ 12a∗d
1
2ac− 12 ibd+ 12 ib∗d∗ + 12a∗c∗

 =


Re(bd)− Im(ac)
Re(bc∗) + Im(ad∗)
Re(ad∗) + Im(b∗c)
Re(ac) + Im(bd)


The most general form of a, b, c, d is:
a = eiα cos 12θ
b = eiβ sin 12θ
c = eiγ cos 12ω
d = eiδ sin 12ω
which gives the operators
UA =
[
eiα cos 12θ e
iβ sin 12θ
−e−iβ sin 12θ e−iα cos 12θ
]
UB =
[
eiγ cos 12ω e
iδ sin 12ω
−e−iδ sin 12ω e−iγ cos 12ω
]
Calling |EFF 〉 = J† (UA ⊗ UB)J |FF 〉 and |EBB〉 = J† (UA ⊗ UB) J |BB〉, the final states in
function of these angles become:
|EFF 〉 =


cos 12θ cos
1
2ω cos (α+ γ)− sin 12θ sin 12ω sin (β + δ)
sin 12θ cos
1
2ω sin (−β + γ)− cos 12θ sin 12ω cos (α− δ)
− sin 12θ cos 12ω cos (−β + γ) + cos 12θ sin 12ω sin (α− δ)
cos 12θ cos
1
2ω sin (α+ γ) + sin
1
2θ sin
1
2ω cos (β + δ)


|EBB〉 =


− cos 12θ cos 12ω sin (α+ γ) + sin 12θ sin 12ω cos (β + δ)
sin 12θ cos
1
2ω cos (−β + γ) + cos 12θ sin 12ω sin (α− δ)
sin 12θ cos
1
2ω sin (−β + γ) + cos 12θ sin 12ω cos (α− δ)
cos 12θ cos
1
2ω cos (α+ γ) + sin
1
2θ sin
1
2ω sin (β + δ)


Defining
x = cos 12θ
y = cos 12ω
z = sin (α+ γ)
w = sin (β + δ)
4it is possible to write
|EFF 〉 =


xy
√
(1− z2)−
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)w
−
√
(1− x2)y sin (β − γ)− x
√
(1− y2) cos (−α+ δ)
−
√
(1− x2)y cos (β − γ)− x
√
(1− y2) sin (−α+ δ)
xyz +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)
√
(1− w2)


|EBB〉 =


−xyz +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)
√
(1− w2)√
(1− x2)y cos (β − γ)− x
√
(1− y2) sin (−α+ δ)
−
√
(1− x2)y sin (β − γ) + x
√
(1− y2) cos (−α+ δ)
xy
√
(1− z2) +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)w


The restriction β = δ = 0, used by some authors results on:
|EFF 〉 =


xy
√
(1− z2)
−
√
(1− x2)y sin (−γ)− x
√
(1− y2) cos (−α)
−
√
(1− x2)y cos (−γ)− x
√
(1− y2) sin (−α)
xyz +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)


EBB〉 =


−xyz +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)√
(1− x2)y cos (−γ)− x
√
(1− y2) sin (−α)
−
√
(1− x2)y sin (−γ) + x
√
(1− y2) cos (−α)
xy
√
(1− z2)


Further restriction α = γ = 0 reduces to the classical case
|EFF 〉 =


xy
−x
√
(1− y2)
−
√
(1− x2)y√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)


|EBB〉 =


√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)√
(1− x2)y−
x
√
(1− y2)
xy


The asymmetric game, in which Alice can use restricted quantum operators and Bob, only
classical ones, is obtained by imposing γ = 0 on the 2× 2 quantum case, resulting on:
|EFF 〉 =


cos 12θ cos
1
2ω cosα
− cos 12θ sin 12ω cosα
− sin 12θ cos 12ω + cos 12θ sin 12ω sinα
cos 12θ cos
1
2ω sinα+ sin
1
2θ sin
1
2ω

 =


xy
√
(1− z2)
−x
√
(1− y2)
√
(1− z2)
−
√
(1− x2)y + x
√
(1− y2)z
xyz +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)


|EBB〉 =


− cos 12θ cos 12ω sinα+ sin 12θ sin 12ω
sin 12θ cos
1
2ω + cos
1
2θ sin
1
2ω sinα
cos 12θ sin
1
2ω cosα
cos 12θ cos
1
2ω cosα

 =


−xyz +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)√
(1− x2)y + x
√
(1− y2)z
x
√
(1− y2)
√
(1− z2)
xy
√
(1− z2)


where z = sinα
4 Analysis
4.1 Case 3×3
As remarked by Du et. al. [7], the totally entangled 3 × 3 case doesn´t have pure quantum
equilibria (mixed quantum equilibria, defined by way of probability measures over the set of
admissible density matrices, may exist - in fact, Lee and Jonhson [13] seem to have proved
they always do). The argument here goes as follows: define u = xy = cos 12θ cos
1
2ω and
v =
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2) = sin 12θ sin 12ω ; then, the payoffs corresponding to |EBB〉 are
$A =
(
−uz + v
√
(1− w2)
)2
+ 2
(
u
√
(1− z2) + vw
)2
$B = 2
(
−uz + v
√
(1− w2)
)2
+
(
u
√
(1− z2) + vw
)2
Let z = sin ρ and w = sinσ. Then
5$A =
(
−u sinρ+ v
√(
1− sin2 σ))2 + 2(u√(1− sin2 ρ)+ v sinσ)2 = 32u2 + 12u2 cos 2ρ +
uv sin (ρ+ σ) − 3uv sin (ρ− σ) − 12v2 cos 2σ + 32v2 , whose only candidates for extrema on the
variables ρ and σ are 2 (u± v)2 , at (ρ, σ) ∈ {0, k pi2 |k ∈ Z}. These values for (ρ, σ) correspond
to (z, w) ∈ {0,±1}. With such values of z and w, the results are always $B = 2$A or $A = 2$B,
where min ($A, $B) ∈
{
(u± v)2
}
. As neither Alice nor Bob can control z or w independently,
whatever be the triplet (θ, α, β) chosen by Alice, Bob can always change (γ, δ) so as to set z
and w to values that give him $B = max
{
2 (u+ v)
2
, 2 (u− v)2
}
and, whatever be the triplet
(ω, γ, δ) chosen by Bob, Alice can always change (α, β) so as to set z and w to values that give her
$A = max
{
2 (u+ v)
2
, 2 (u− v)2
}
. And both can escape the case $B = $A = 0 (when u = v = 0) by
changing unilaterally the parameters that they really control (θ for Alice, ω for Bob), as u = v = 0
requires (z = 1, w = 0) or (z = 0, w = 1) .
The same analysis applies to |EFF 〉.
4.2 Case 2×2
The payoffs in this case are:
$A(FF ) =
(
xy
√
(1− z2)
)2
+ 2
(
xyz +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)
)2
$B(FF ) = 2
(
xy
√
(1− z2)
)2
+
(
xyz +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)
)2
$A(BB) =
(
−xyz +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)
)2
+ 2
(
xy
√
(1− z2)
)2
$B(BB) = 2
(
−xyz +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)
)2
+
(
xy
√
(1− z2)
)2
where (FF ) and (BB) indicate the initial state |Ei〉 of the system. It is sufficient to notice that,
in the case FF, Alice can always annulate the first term by setting x = 0, which results in $A = 2$B,
giving Bob no other choice then agreeing to maximize the second term, which is accomplished by
setting y = 0, resulting in $B = 1. As Alice can never expect to get a payoff bigger then 2, the
resulting profile gives no incentive to change for the members of the couple, thus being a Nash
equilibrium. In the case BB, it is Bob who has the couteau and the fromage, being able to annulate
the second term, by setting y = 0, leaving Alice no choice other then choosing x = 0 to maximize
her payoff.
Reminding that x = cos 12θ and y = cos
1
2ω,in all of the above equilibria the players use the
flipping operators:
UA =
[
eiα cos 12θ sin
1
2θ
− sin 12θ e−iα cos 12θ
]
=
[
0 ±1
∓1 0
]
UB =
[
eiγ cos 12ω sin
1
2ω
− sin 12ω e−iγ cos 12ω
]
=
[
0 ±1
∓1 0
]
Indeed all equilibria of this case favor Alice, when |Ei〉 = |FF 〉 and Bob, when |Ei〉 = |BB〉.
To see this, write
$A(FF ) = u
2
(
1− z2)+ 2 (uz + v)2 = u2z2 + 4vuz + (u2 + 2v2)
$B(FF ) = 2u
2
(
1− z2)+ (uz + v)2 = −u2z2 + 2vuz + 2u2 + v2
with the same definitions of u and v as before. Then
∂
∂z
$A(FF ) = 2u
2z + 4vu
∂
∂z
$B(FF ) = −2u2z + 2vu
∂2
∂z2
$A(FF ) = 2u
2
∂2
∂z2
$B(FF ) = −2u2
Alice´s payoff is maximized at the extremities |z| = 1; Bob´s, on z = v
u
. As neither can control
z independently, whatever value one sets to z the other one can unset. As a consequence, in any
equilibrium, they must agree as to the best value of z. This will be the case only if
∣∣ v
u
∣∣ = 1. Then,
the payoffs are reduced to $A(FF ) = 2$B(FF ) = 2 (uz + v)
2, obliging them to coordinate to make
6|uz + v| = 1, thus jointly maximizing their payoffs, but maintaining the bias towards Alice, who
gets 2, while Bob gets 1. Besides, Bob must not have incentive to choose y such that
∣∣ v
u
∣∣ 6= 1.
Equilibria of the kind |z| = 1, |u| = |v| reduce the payoffs to
$A = 2 (uz + v)
2
$B = (uz + v)
2
If z = 1, then |u+ v| = 1 and v = u = ± 12 .
If z = −1, then |−u+ v| = 1 and v = −u = ± 12 .
Now,
u = xy = 12 implies y =
1
2x
v =
√
1− x2
√
1− y2 = 12
√
(1− x2)
√(
4− 1
x2
)
= 12
√
(1−x2)
x
√
(4x2 − 1)
1
2
√
(1−x2)
x
√
(4x2 − 1) = 12 , which results on x = 12
√
2 and, thus, y = 12
√
2
As a consequence, these equilibria require |z| = 1, |x| = 12
√
2 = |y| = 12
√
2.
The condition |x| = 12
√
2 is translated for θ as:∣∣cos 12θ∣∣ = 12√2, which is satisfied by θ = ± (12pi + 2kpi)
By the same token, ω = ± ( 12pi + 2kpi)
The corresponding operators are of the type:
UA =
1
2
√
2
[ ±eiα ±1
∓1 ±e−iα
]
UB =
1
2
√
2
[ ±eiγ ±1
∓1 ±e−iγ
]
recalling that these equilibria, as the former ones, give 2 to Alice and 1 to Bob.
Given the symmetry, the analysis of |EBB〉 follows the same lines. In this case, all equilibria
give 2 to Bob and 1 to Alice.
What is new here, besides the explicitation of the analysis, is the comparison between the two
cases, FF and BB, showing that the simple interchange of i = ei
pi
2 in the components of the state
J |Ei〉, changes completely the balance of a game otherwise symmetrical. That is: define the system
being controlled by the players by the pair (J, |Gi〉), where |Gi〉 = J |Ei〉; then, a change from
|Gi〉 =
(
1
2
√
2, 0, 0, 12 i
√
2
)
to |Gi〉 =
(
1
2 i
√
2, 0, 0, 12
√
2
)
turns a game totally favorable to Alice to one
totally favorable to Bob.
4.3 Case 2×1
In this case, the operators available for the players are:
UA =
[
eiα cos θ2 sin
θ
2
− sin θ2 e−iα cos θ2
]
UB =
[
cos 12ω sin
1
2ω
− sin 12ω cos 12ω
]
Then,
$A(FF ) =
(
cos 12θ cos
1
2ω cosα
)2
+ 2
(
cos 12θ cos
1
2ω sinα+ sin
1
2θ sin
1
2ω
)2
$B(FF ) = 2
(
cos 12θ cos
1
2ω cosα
)2
+
(
cos 12θ cos
1
2ω sinα+ sin
1
2θ sin
1
2ω
)2
$A(BB) =
(− cos 12θ cos 12ω sinα+ sin 12θ sin 12ω)2 + 2 (cos 12θ cos 12ω cosα)2
$B(BB) = 2
(− cos 12θ cos 12ω sinα+ sin 12θ sin 12ω)2 + (cos 12θ cos 12ω cosα)2
With the same definitions as before, the only difference being that now z = sinα, which gives
it total control by Alice, the analysis is the following:
The first and fourth components of the final quantum state |EFF 〉 are:[
xy
√
(1− z2)
xyz +
√
(1− x2)
√
(1− y2)
]
The payoffs become, with the definitions of u and v already given:
7$A = u
2(1− z2) + 2(uz + v)2 = u2z2 + 4vuz + u2 + 2v2
$B = 2u
2(1− z2) + (uz + v)2 = −u2z2 + 2vuz + 2u2 + v2
As $A(z) is a parable upwards, Alice always chooses |z| = 1. Then,
$A = 2(uz + v)
2
$B = (uz + v)
2
Alice e Bob coordinate to maximize |uz + v| .
Because the minimum of $A(z) is at z = − 2vu , if u and v have opposite signs, Alice chooses
z=-1; otherwise, z=1. Now,
u = cos 12θ cos
1
2ω
v = sin 12θ sin
1
2ω
Suppose c and d have equal signs. Then, z=1 and
|uz + v| = |u+ v| = ∣∣cos 12θ cos 12ω + sin 12θ sin 12ω∣∣
The maximum value of this expression is 1, attained a ω = θ + 2kpi, k ∈ Z.
Suppose c and d have opposite signs. Then, z=-1 and
|uz − v| = |u− v| = ∣∣cos 12θ cos 12ω − sin 12θ sin 12ω∣∣
The maximum value of this expression is 1, attained a ω = −θ + 2kpi, k ∈ Z.
Particularly, for θ, ω ∈ {pi + 2kpi|k ∈ Z}, UA and UB become independent from α, so that this
parameter is free.
When |Ei〉 = |BB〉, the final state has the following first and fourth components:[ −xyz +√(1− x2)√(1− y2)
xy
√
(1− z2)
]
The payoffs are:
$A = 2u
2(1− z2) + (−uz + v)2 = −u2z2 − 2vuz + 2u2 + v2
$B = u
2(1− z2) + 2(uz + v)2 = u2z2 + 4vuz + u2 + 2v2
∂
∂z
$A = −2u2z − 2uv
$A(z) is a downwards parable, with its maximum at z = − 1uv.
So, if 1
u
v ∈ [−1, 1], Alice chooses z = − 1
u
v; otherwise, |z| = 1.
Suppose 1
u
v ∈ [−1, 1]. Then,
$A = 2u
2
(
1− 1
u2
v2
)
+ 4v2 = 2u2 + 2v2
$B = u
2
(
1− 1
u2
v2
)
= u2 − v2
To maximize his payoff, Bob annulates v, by setting |y| = 1. The resulting payoffs are:
$A = 2u
2
$B = u
2
and Alice maximizes u by choosing |x| = 1. As v = 0 and u 6= 0, the hypothesis 1
u
v ∈ [−1, 1] is
still valid.
This leaves Bob with no other choice than setting |y| = 1. The result is 2 to Alice and 1 to Bob.
Suppose that 1
u
v /∈ [−1, 1]. Then Alice chooses |z| = 1 and
$A = (−uz + v)2
$B = 2(uz + v)
2
Thus, Bob tries to maximize |uz + v| and Alice, |−uz + v| . Both are simultaneously maximized
only when uz = 0. As z 6= 0, u must be annulated, which any player has the power to do unilaterally.
So, in the equilibria, u=0 and the payoffs become
$A = v
2
$B = 2v
2
The players coordinate to maximize |v| by setting |x| = |y| = 1. As v 6= 0 and u = 0, the
hypothesis 1
u
v /∈ [−1, 1] is still valid.
As u=0, z becomes irrelevant, which frees α. The result is 2 to Bob and 1 to Alice.
This case, having only three real parameters, allows the graphical illustration below, showing
the sets of Nash equilibria in the parameter space.
Figure 1: Quantum Alice versus classical Bob - points of the parameter space belonging to the
bold straight segments are the Nash equilibria of this quantum version of the battle of the sexes
game. The initial state is FF. All equilibria favor Alice ($A = 2, $B = 1). Vertical axis is ω,
horizontal is θ and the one perpendicular to the page is α.
Figure 2: Quantum Alice versus classical Bob - points of the parameter space belonging to the
8Fig. 1.
Fig. 2.
9bold straight segments are Nash equilibria of this quantum version of the battle of the sexes game.
The initial state is BB. Most equilibria favor Bob ($A = 1, $B = 2). In the isolate points shown, the
equilibrium favors Alice ($A = 2, $B = 1). Vertical axis is ω, horizontal is θ and the one parallel to
the bold straight lines is α.
4.4 Some simpler models
Marinatto and Weber [10] analyzed the non-entangled case, where J = I (the identity operator,
obtained by setting γ = 0 in J´s formula) with initial state |BB〉, without restrictions on the
parameters set. The final state is given by
|EBB〉 = (UA ⊗ UB) |BB〉 =


ac ad bc bd
−ad∗ ac∗ −bd∗ bc∗
−b∗c −b∗d a∗c a∗d
b∗d∗ −b∗c∗ −a∗d∗ a∗c∗




0
0
0
1

 =


bd
bc∗
a∗d
a∗c∗


which results in the payoffs:
$A = |bd|2 + 2|a∗c∗|2 = |b|2 |d|2 + 2 |a|2 |c|2 =
(
1− x2) (1− y2)+ 2x2y2
$B = 2 |bd|2 + |a∗c∗|2 = 2 |b|2 |d|2 + |a|2 |c|2 = 2
(
1− x2) (1− y2)+ x2y2
If the initial state is |FF 〉, the situation changes to:
|EFF 〉 = (UA ⊗ UB) |FF 〉 =


ac ad bc bd
−ad∗ ac∗ −bd∗ bc∗
−b∗c −b∗d a∗c a∗d
b∗d∗ −b∗c∗ −a∗d∗ a∗c∗




1
0
0
0

 =


ac
−ad∗
−b∗c
b∗d∗


which results in the payoffs:
$A = 2 |b∗d∗|2 + |ac|2 = 2 |b|2 |d|2 + |a|2 |c|2 = 2
(
1− x2) (1− y2)+ x2y2
$B = |b∗d∗|2 + 2|ac|2 = |b|2 |d|2 + 2 |a|2 |c|2 =
(
1− x2) (1− y2)+ 2x2y2
Both cases above reproduce the classical game, sufficing to identify x and y with the probabilities
of Alice and Bob, respectively, choosing ballet, in the first case (|EBB〉) and choosing football, in
the second one (|EFF 〉). Thus, the equilibria are (x, y) ∈
{
(1, 1) , (0, 0) ,
(
2
3 ,
1
3
)}
, in the first case,
and (x, y) ∈ {(1, 1) , (0, 0) , (13 , 23)}.
Now, suppose the initial state fed to the system is already entangled.
First, let |Ei〉 =
√
2
2 (|FF 〉+ |BB〉) .
In the basis here used, this is represented by the vector
√
2
2 (1001). So
|Ef 〉 = (UA ⊗ UB) |Ei〉 =
√
2
2


ac ad bc bd
−ad∗ ac∗ −bd∗ bc∗
−b∗c −b∗d a∗c a∗d
b∗d∗ −b∗c∗ −a∗d∗ a∗c∗




1
0
0
1

 =


1
2
√
2ac+ 12
√
2bd
− 12
√
2ad∗ + 12
√
2bc∗
− 12
√
2b∗c+ 12
√
2a∗d
1
2
√
2b∗d∗ + 12
√
2a∗c∗


The resulting payoffs are:
$A =
1
2
(
|ac+ bd|2 + 2|a∗c∗ + b∗d∗|2
)
= 32 |ac+ bd|
2
$B =
1
2
(
2 |ac+ bd|2 + |a∗c∗ + b∗d∗|2
)
= 32 |ac+ bd|2
So, in this case, $A = $B whatever are the values of the parameters and this is a game of
coordination, with both players being interested in raising |ac+ bd|2 to it´s maximal attainable
value, which is 1. When they get this, the expected payoffs are 32 for each one. This is equivalent
to, in the classical game, the couple making a decision like a single entity, by flipping a coin and
deciding to go to football, if it turns out as head, and to ballet otherwise, which is basically a one
player (the couple) game.
Is there an asymmetry between |Ei〉 =
√
2
2 (i|FF 〉+ |BB〉) and |Ei〉 =
√
2
2 (|FF 〉+ i|BB〉), as
in the case when J was chosen with γ = pi2 ?
This case is equivalent to defining the quantum game by |Ef 〉 = (UA ⊗ UB)J |BB〉 and
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|Ef 〉 = (UA ⊗ UB)J |FF 〉, respectively, with J = J
(
γ = pi2
)
, that is, skipping the post multiplication
by J†.
Suppose |Ei〉 =
√
2
2 (i|FF 〉+ |BB〉). Then
|Ef 〉 = (UA ⊗ UB) |Ei〉 =
√
2
2


ac ad bc bd
−ad∗ ac∗ −bd∗ bc∗
−b∗c −b∗d a∗c a∗d
b∗d∗ −b∗c∗ −a∗d∗ a∗c∗




i
0
0
1

 =


1
2 i
√
2ac+ 12
√
2bd
− 12 i
√
2ad∗ + 12
√
2bc∗
− 12 i
√
2b∗c+ 12
√
2a∗d
1
2 i
√
2b∗d∗ + 12
√
2a∗c∗


The resulting payoffs are:
$A =
1
2
(
|iac+ bd|2 + 2|a∗c∗ + ib∗d∗|2
)
$B =
1
2
(
2 |iac+ bd|2 + |a∗c∗ + ib∗d∗|2
)
But iac+ bd = i (a∗c∗ + ib∗d∗)∗
So |iac+ bd|2 = |a∗c∗ + ib∗d∗|2
As a result, $A = $B =
3
2 |iac+ bd|
2
and, again, the game is one of coordination, with all equilibria at |iac+ bd| = 1 and
$A = $B =
3
2 .
Suppose |Ei〉 =
√
2
2 (|FF 〉+ i|BB〉). Then
|Ef 〉 = (UA ⊗ UB) |Ei〉 =
√
2
2


ac ad bc bd
−ad∗ ac∗ −bd∗ bc∗
−b∗c −b∗d a∗c a∗d
b∗d∗ −b∗c∗ −a∗d∗ a∗c∗




1
0
0
i

 =


1
2
√
2ac+ 12
√
2ibd
− 12
√
2ad∗ + 12
√
2ibc∗
− 12
√
2b∗c+ 12
√
2ia∗d
1
2
√
2b∗d∗ + 12
√
2ia∗c∗


The resulting payoffs are:
$A =
1
2
(
|ac+ ibd|2 + 2|ia∗c∗ + b∗d∗|2
)
$B =
1
2
(
2 |ac+ ibd|2 + |ia∗c∗ + b∗d∗|2
)
But ac+ ibd = i (ia∗c∗ + b∗d∗)∗
So |ac+ bd|2 = |ia∗c∗ + b∗d∗|2
As a result, $A = $B =
3
2 |ac+ ibd|2
and, again, the game is one of coordination, with all equilibria at |ac+ ibd| = 1 and
$A = $B =
3
2 .
Paraphrasing Benjamin and Hayden [11] , in these coherent equilibria, entanglement
shared among the players enables different kinds of cooperative behavior: indeed it
can act as a contract, in the sense that it obliges the players to coordinate with each
other.
5 Conclusion
Some versions of the quantum battle of the sexes game reproduce the classical one, in the sense
that equal proportions of the equilibria favor Alice ($A = 2, $B = 1) and Bob ($A = 1, $B = 2) and
another set gives them both an expected payoff of 23 . In other versions, all equilibria favor Alice or
all favor Bob, the difference between one type and the other being just a phase in the initial state
of the system. In a third kind of versions, the payoffs are equal to each other independently of the
operator that each player chooses, all equilibria giving both an expected payoff of 32 . In a fourth
kind, there are no Nash pure quantum equilibria at all.
Quantum games, as any other game, can be viewed as a dispute between two or more players
11
to control a system; thus, they are defined by the system and the way the players are connected to
it; if any of these change, the game changes; as a consequence, it is arguable if its name should be
kept. To name ”battle of the sexes” games with completely different qualitative features may not
be reasonable.
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